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Climate Change, Scale, and Devaluation:  The 
Challenge of Our Built Environment 
Nathan F. Sayre* 
Abstract 
Climate debate and policy proposals in the United States have yet to 
grasp the gravity and magnitude of the challenges posed by global warming.  
This paper develops three arguments to redress this situation.  First, the spatial 
and temporal scale of the processes linking greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
to climate change is unprecedented in human experience, challenging our 
abilities to comprehend, let alone act.  An adequate understanding of the scale 
of global warming leads to an unequivocal starting point for all discussions:  
we must leave as much fossil fuel in the ground as possible, for as long as 
possible.  Second, a policy informed by this insight must focus on the built 
environment, which mediates economic production, exchange, and 
consumption in ways that both presuppose and reinforce high rates of GHG 
emissions, especially in the U.S.  A rapid and comprehensive reconfiguration 
of the built environment is imperative if we are to mitigate and adapt to global 
warming.  Third, the obstacles and opposition to such a reconfiguration are 
best understood in terms of the devaluation of fixed capital, public and private 
investments alike, that has been sunk in the built environment of the present.  In 
a fortuitous paradox, these investments are threatened with devaluation 
whether or not we act to stabilize the atmospheric GHG concentrations; in 
highly uneven, unpredictable, and potentially abrupt ways, global warming 
will make our current built environment increasingly untenable and 
uneconomical.  There is, therefore, no reason not to be proactive and to craft 
policies with the goal of completely redesigning and rebuilding our built 
environment over the next 20 to 50 years. 
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I. Introduction 
Writing in Science Magazine1 in 2007, renowned climate scientist Wallace 
Broecker declared, "[i]f we are ever to succeed in capping the buildup of the 
atmosphere’s CO2 content, we must make a first-order change in the way we 
view the problem."2  He pointed out that merely reducing the rate of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is insufficient, as this would still result in a 
continuing rise in atmospheric GHG concentrations, and therefore continued 
global warming.3  The only real solution, Broecker argued, is to stabilize 
concentrations, and he offered the following "CO2 Arithmetic" to clarify the 
implications: 
Currently, for each 4 gigatons (Gt) of fossil carbon burned, the 
atmosphere’s CO2 content rises about 1 ppm; including deforestation, we 
now emit about 8 Gt of carbon per year. Further, this four-to-one ratio will 
only change slowly in the coming decades. Hence, if we set a desirable 
upper limit on the extent to which we allow the CO2 content of the 
atmosphere to increase, then this fixes the size of the carbon pie.4  
The point of the pie metaphor is that GHG emissions must be limited 
absolutely to achieve any real solution to climate change.  For example, to 
achieve stabilization at twice pre-industrial levels, which is considered by many 
scientists to be dangerously high but is still much lower than the projection for 
2100, humanity can only emit about 720 Gt of additional carbon from now 
onwards.5  We will exhaust the carbon pie before the end of the century at 
current rates of GHG emissions, and much sooner if rates increase as expected. 
 Broecker, believing that such a target is unattainable by other means, went on 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Wallace S. Broecker, Climate Change:  CO2 Arithmetic, SCI. MAG., Mar. 9, 2007, at 
1371. 
 2. Id.    
 3. See id.  
 4. Id.  
 5. The carbon pie has already shrunk since Broecker wrote. It now amounts to about 696 
Gt, as concentrations have risen from 380 to 386 ppm. 
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to argue for technologies to capture CO2 directly from the atmosphere,
6 a 
strategy he describes at greater length in the book Fixing Climate.7  Such 
technologies, if they can be invented and deployed on an enormous scale, 
would expand the carbon pie and relax the limits that Broecker described.  
Counting on such a silver bullet is a high-risk strategy, however, akin to 
continuing to smoke on the assumption that a cure to cancer will be found in 
time to save you.  Technological optimism may also distract us from making 
the "first-order change in the way we view the problem" that Broecker urged in 
the opening sentence of his article.8  Understanding the climate science behind 
Broecker’s CO2 arithmetic is only one part of making this change; we must also 
consider political and economic circumstances, which are absent from his 
analysis.  Why does addressing climate change require an absolute limit on total 
GHG emissions, and not just reductions in emissions rates?  How can we 
realize such a limit?  Finally, why does it seem so unattainable? What are the 
fundamental obstacles to an adequate climate policy? 
I offer three interlinked arguments in answer to these questions.  First, the 
spatial and temporal scale of the processes linking GHG emissions to climate 
change is unprecedented in human experience, challenging our abilities to 
comprehend, let alone act.  An adequate understanding of the scale of global 
warming leads to an unequivocal starting point for all discussions:  we must 
leave as much fossil fuel in the ground as possible, for as long as possible.  
Second, policies informed by this insight must focus on the built environment, 
which mediates economic production, exchange, and consumption in ways that 
both presuppose and reinforce high rates of GHG emissions, especially in the 
U.S.  A rapid and comprehensive reconfiguration of the built environment is 
imperative if we are to mitigate and adapt to global warming.  Third, the 
obstacles and opposition to such a reconfiguration are best understood in terms 
of the devaluation of fixed capital, public and private investments alike, which 
has been sunk in the built environment of the present.  In a fortuitous paradox, 
these investments are threatened with devaluation whether or not we act to 
stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations; in highly uneven, unpredictable, 
and potentially abrupt ways, global warming will make our current built 
environment increasingly untenable and uneconomical.  Therefore, there is no 
reason not to be proactive and to craft policies with the goal of completely 
redesigning and rebuilding our built environment over the next 20 to 50 years. 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See id. 
 7. See WALLACE S. BROECKER & ROBERT KUNZIG, FIXING CLIMATE:  WHAT PAST 
CLIMATE CHANGES REVEAL ABOUT THE CURRENT THREAT—AND HOW TO COUNTER IT.  (Hill and 
Wang 2008). 
 8. Broecker, supra note 1, at 1371.   
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II. The Scale of Global Warming 
Science journalist Elizabeth Kolbert has written that “[f]or better or 
(mostly) for worse, global warming is all about scale.”9  Scientists typically 
define scale in terms of grain or resolution, on the one hand, and extent, on the 
other.10  Grain refers to the smallest unit of measurement employed to study 
some phenomenon, and therefore the precision or detail that can be detected.11  
Extent is the overall dimensions over which observations are made, including 
both space (area) and time (duration).12  Different phenomena require different 
scales, because the grain and extent of a study need to "fit" what one is 
observing in order to detect meaningful patterns or dynamics. A simple 
illustration:  the grain used to time a race has to be fine enough to distinguish 
among the racers.  In world-class swimming, for example, this is hundredths or 
even thousandths of a second; if the grain were coarser—seconds, in this 
example—there would be lots of ties, defeating the purpose of the race.  
Generally speaking, grain and extent vary in rough proportion to each other:  a 
large extent means a coarser grain, whereas a finer grain is called for when 
making measurements over smaller extents.  Longer races, to continue the 
example, can generally be timed using larger units.  This is the case for both 
methodological and ontological reasons. 
If one applies this definition of scale to environmental phenomena 
themselves, rather than to the measurements used to study them, it becomes 
clear that Kolbert is right to suggest that the scale of global warming is unlike 
anything else that humanity has ever experienced.13  The processes that link 
GHG emissions to climate change combine extremely fine grains and extremely 
large extents, both spatially and temporally. 
Spatially, the grain is minutely small:  individual molecules of CO2 and 
other greenhouse gases.14  They are invisible to the naked eye and produced in 
myriad ways, for example:  when we breathe or turn over a spade of soil, when 
                                                                                                                 
 9. ELIZABETH KOLBERT, FIELD NOTES FROM A CATASTROPHE:  MAN, NATURE, AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (Bloomsbury Publishers 2006). 
 10. See Nathan F. Sayre, Ecological and Geographical Scale:  Parallels and Potential for 
Integration, 29 PROGRESS IN HUM. GEOGRAPHY 276, 278 (2005).   
 11. See id. at   
 12. See id. at  
 13. KOLBERT, supra note 9, at  
 14. See C.L. Sabine and R.A. Feely. 2003. Carbon Dioxide. Pp. 335-343 in J.R. Holton, 
J.A. Curry and J.A. Pyle, eds. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCES. Academic Press. See 
also E.G. Nisbet. 2003. Biogeochemical cycles:  Carbon cycle. Pp. 196-201 in J.R. Holton, J.A. 
Curry and J.A. Pyle, eds. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCES. Academic Press. [USE 
THESE TWO SOURCES FOR FOOTNOTES 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, & 22.] 
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a plant decays, when a cow ruminates, as well as when wood, coal, gas or oil is 
burnt.15  But the extent is global:  all those molecules join the earth’s 
atmosphere and quickly mix together, becoming equal parts of the enhanced 
greenhouse effect.16  Over time, some CO2 molecules are absorbed by plants, 
some by the oceans, some by the soil, and some eventually degrade or break 
down, but where or from what they were earlier emitted has no effect on the 
path they subsequently take.17  The impacts of global warming are not 
homogeneous in space, and GHG emissions are also very unevenly 
distributed.18  But the process by which greenhouse gases enhance the 
greenhouse effect is indifferent to such geographical specifics. 
Temporally, the grain is likewise infinitesimal:  that split second at which 
a chemical reaction occurs in combustion, photosynthesis, oxidation, decay, 
etc.19  But the extent is very long:  once a molecule of carbon dioxide or nitrous 
oxide enters the atmosphere, it remains there for more than a century; most 
other greenhouse gases persist for one-to-several decades.20  Looking backward 
in time, the temporal extent is longer still, although it varies depending on the 
process by which a carbon molecule was earlier sequestered; it could be 
decades or centuries for carbon stored in trees, up to centuries for carbon in the 
soil, and hundreds of millions of years for the carbon in coal, gas or oil.21 This 
combination of short grain and long extent means that whatever the amount of 
CO2 emitted in excess of the amount reabsorbed or sequestered during a given 
period of time is out there for good, for all practical purposes.22  
The difficulties of confronting global warming are a function of these 
unique scalar qualities.  Such extreme disparities between spatio-temporal grain 
and extent are exceptional among environmental processes of any direct 
significance to humans. Pollution of air, water, and soil is often fine-grained, 
                                                                                                                 
 15. See note 14 above. 
 16. See note 14 above. Other greenhouse gases have different global warming potentials 
(GWP) per molecule; I use CO2 here because it is the single largest contributor to the enhanced 
greenhouse effect overall. The point is that greenhouse gases from all sources join the 
atmosphere at a global scale to produce warming. 
 17. See note 14 above. 
 18. Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri, and A. Reisinger (Eds.) Core Writing Team, 
Pachauri, R.K. and Reisinger, A. (Eds.). CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUPS I, II AND III TO THE 
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE. IPCC 
(2007). 
 19. See note 14 above. 
 20. See T.J. Blasing, Recent Greenhouse Gas Concentrations, CARBON DIOXIDE INFO. 
ANALYSIS CENTER, http://cdiac.ornl.gov/pns/current_ghg.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).  
 21. Blasing, supra note 20. See also note 14 above. 
 22. Sayre, supra note 9, at Blasing, supra note 20. See also note 14 above.  
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but usually local-to-regional in spatial extent, with a temporal extent of weeks 
to decades.23  Even nitrogen loading and soil erosion, which have small grains, 
large extents, and persistent effects, can be addressed at regional scales over 
periods of years to decades.24  Earthquakes provide a partial analog to climate 
change, insofar as vast quantities of energy accumulate so slowly, over so much 
space and time, as to pass unnoticed until the event occurs.25  Earthquakes, 
however, are temporally discrete and spatially limited, whereas climate change 
is global and, in most respects, extremely gradual in its effects.  Radioactivity is 
analogous in a different way:  it is invisibly small in substance yet persistent on 
a temporal scale of millennia and dispersed around the world due to above 
ground nuclear testing during the Cold War.26  But radioactivity of the kind we 
worry about is not produced by nearly so many organisms, processes and 
activities as greenhouse gases, and its impacts (as of yet) have been limited.27  
Finally, volcanoes can affect climate at the global scale, but only for a few 
years.28  One might venture the thought that humans can barely think at the 
scale of global warming—after all, we have never had to do so before.29  More 
specifically, the reason we must live within an absolute limit of GHG 
emissions, why Broecker’s carbon pie is finite, is the enormous difference of 
temporal scale between fossil fuels and other sources and sinks of atmospheric 
CO2.  When a grassland burns, it releases carbon that was sequestered just 1-10 
years before. The carbon released by a forest fire was sequestered decades or at 
                                                                                                                 
 23. For air pollution see H.L. Windsor and R. Toumi. 2001. Scaling and persistence of 
UK pollution. ATMOSPHERIC ENVIRONMENT 35: 4545-4556. For soil and water pollution see 
K.C. Jones and P. de Voogt. 1999. Persistent organic pollutants (POPs):  state of the science. 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION 100: 209-221.  
 24. See, e.g., W.J. Mitsch et al. 2001. Reducing nitrogen loading to the Gulf of Mexico 
from the Mississippi River Basin:  strategies to counter a persistent ecological problem. 
BIOSCIENCE 51: 373-388. C. Huang, L.D. Norton and D.C. Flanagan. 2009. Challenges in 
linking agricultural soil erosion studies to landscape scale processes. GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH 
ABSTRACTS 11: 10142 (at: 
http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publications.htm?seq_no_115=236013). 
 25. A. Sornette and D. Sornette. 1989. Self-organized criticality and earthquakes. 
EUROPHYSICS LETTERS 9: 197-202. 
 26. See R. Wolfson. 1991. NUCLEAR CHOICES:  A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO NUCLEAR 
TECHNOLOGY. MIT Press, pp. 60-63. E. Welsome. 1999. THE PLUTONIUM FILES. Dell Publishing. 
 27. R.L. Murray. 2003. UNDERSTANDING RADIOACTIVE WASTE. 5th edition. Battelle Press. 
 28. A. Robock. 2000. Volcanic eruptions and climate. REVIEW OF GEOPHYSICS 38: 191-
219.  
 29. It is rather like the revolution produced by geology when it became irrefutably clear 
that the earth was not thousands but billions of years old—only this time we’re dealing with the 
future rather than just the past, and with a problem whose implications are practical rather than 
merely intellectual, theological or doctrinal. This time, our understanding is not the only thing at 
stake. 
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most centuries ago.  With fossil fuels, by contrast, sequestration occurred 
hundreds of millions of years ago; 6-8 orders of magnitude greater than with 
plants, 5-6 orders of magnitude greater than with soils.  These disparities are 
critically important when evaluating ways to reduce atmospheric CO2 
concentrations because planting trees can only sequester carbon until the trees 
die, and although carbon can stay in soil for centuries, the soil must remain 
unplowed.  As the Keeling Curve shows, atmospheric CO2 concentrations 
oscillate every year due to the aggregate effects of all the vegetation on earth; 
the curve drops by 5-6 ppm during the northern hemisphere’s summer, when 
plants there absorb CO2 in photosynthesis, then it rises as plants senesce and 
decay in the winter.  The point is that compared to the magnitude of the longer-
term trend—atmospheric CO2 is already more than 100 ppm above pre-
industrial levels—the potential of vegetation to address climate change is an 
order of magnitude too small.  
This is not to diminish the significant role that deforestation plays as a 
source of CO2 emissions at present,
30 but rather to point out that no matter what 
happens to forests, it happens on a temporal scale completely different from 
that of fossil fuels.  Although the CO2 from both sources mixes readily in the 
atmosphere, and has equivalent GWP, the two carbon cycles should be seen as 
distinct for purposes of policy.  Efforts to prevent deforestation, or to plant new 
forests, cannot scale up sufficiently because trees simply do not live long 
enough.  A protected forest will still die and release its carbon, and a planted 
forest will do the same, but it will be too soon to effectively ‘cancel out’ the 
release of CO2 from fossil fuels.  The only way around this problem would be 
to cut down the trees before they die and permanently remove them from 
contact with the atmosphere—by sinking them in the deep ocean, burying them 
on land, or shooting them into space.  In other words, as long as fossil fuels 
continue to be burned at rates that exceed the capacity of sinks to absorb the 
resulting emissions at a comparable temporal scale, 31 atmospheric 
concentrations will continue to increase.  Carbon offset and credit trading 
schemes that fail to account for these scale differences are destined to fail, at 
least if we look more than 10 or 100 years down the road.  Unfortunately, this 
applies to virtually all such schemes at the present time. 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See Yadvinder Malhi et al., Climate Change, Deforestation, and the Fate of the 
Amazon, 319 SCIENCE 169, 169 (2008) (noting Amazonian forests “removal by deforestation 
can itself be a driver of climate change and a positive feedback on externally forced climate 
change”). 
 31. The only sinks of this temporal scale are the deep oceans—which are already 
absorbing roughly half of human-produced CO2—and geologic formations deep underground. 
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In the absence of a technological silver bullet, such as the one Broecker 
envisions, the inescapable conclusion is that we need to leave as much coal, oil 
and gas in the ground as possible, for as long as possible.  To say that this is 
politically impossible does not make it any less true.  At the very least, it should 
be the point of departure for all negotiations and debates, as anything less is a 
potentially fateful concession.  
III. The Built Environment 
Policy informed by this conclusion must focus on what geographers call 
the built environment:  buildings, systems of transportation, energy and 
communications, water, sewage and waste management facilities, farms, 
factories, schools and hospitals, etc.32  The built environment “functions as a 
vast, humanly created resource system, comprising use values embedded in the 
physical landscape, which can be utilized for production, exchange and 
consumption.”33  Pacala and Socolow have famously argued that a rapid, 
comprehensive reconfiguration of the world’s built environment has the 
potential to do what Broecker considers impossible; namely, “to meet the 
world’s energy needs over the next 50 years and limit atmospheric CO2 to a 
trajectory that avoids a doubling of the preindustrial concentration.”34  What 
this would require is not so much new technologies, they argue, but an 
aggressive and enormous scaling up of existing technologies in transportation, 
energy, buildings, agriculture and land use.35 
The built environment of the U.S. both presupposes and reinforces high 
rates of GHG emissions.  Its construction itself produced significant emissions, 
and its design reflects the relatively cheap cost of energy during the twentieth 
century.  The built environment is also what enables—and in many ways 
compels—American per capita emissions rates to be among the highest in the 
world.36  The two largest sources of GHG emissions in the U.S., for example, 
                                                                                                                 
 32. See DAVID HARVEY, THE LIMITS TO CAPITAL 233 (1982) (describing aspects of the 
built environment). 
 33. Id.  
 34. S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges:  Solving the Climate Problem for the 
Next 50 Years with Current Technologies., 305 SCIENCE  968, 968 (2004).  
 35. See id. (noting these technologies have passed beyond laboratories and many are 
already being used in industry).   
 36. See The Conference Bd. of Can., Environment: GHG Emissions Per Capita, 
http://www.conferenceboard.ca/hcp/ details/environment/greenhouse-gas-emissions. aspx#_ftn3 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2009) (noting that among developed  nations, only Australia and Canada 
have higher per capita GHG emissions than the US). 
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are electricity generation and transportation, for which coal and petroleum, 
respectively, are by far the major fuels.37  In both cases, consumers have only 
limited scope of influence.  They can reduce their electricity use and drive more 
efficient automobiles, but the power plants, streets, and highways they rely on 
are fixed in place and largely beyond their control, and freight trucking exceeds 
passenger vehicles as a source of GHG emissions in any case.38  One of Pacala 
and Socolow’s “stabilization wedges” involves doubling the average efficiency 
of automobiles,39 a daunting task, but relatively easy in comparison to other 
wedges.  Reducing vehicle miles by fifty percent,40 for example, would entail 
reorganizing the geographical distribution of homes, businesses, schools, and 
so forth.41  Another wedge would require improving the energy efficiency of all 
buildings by 25 percent.42  All three of these measures together would still 
achieve less than half of the necessary reductions, as a total of seven wedges is 
required to keep the concentrations at twice pre-industrial levels in 2050, and 
further steep reductions would still be necessary after that point.43 
Whether built and owned by governments or private firms, the 
components of the built environment have a number of things in common.  
First, they tend to be very expensive to build, and still more so to replace.  The 
interstate highway system, to give just one example, is estimated to have cost 
nearly $129 billion.44  Second, these costs generally must be absorbed up front, 
before revenues can be generated from their use.   
                                                                                                                 
 37. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 
Sinks: 1990-2007, Executive Summary (2009),  http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ 
emissions/usinventoryreport.html, (last visited Oct. 21, 2009) (reporting that electricity 
generation accounted for 42 percent of CO2 emissions from fossil fuels in the US in 2007; 
transportation accounted for 33 percent. They accounted for 34 and 26 percent, respectively, of 
all US GHG emissions).  See also Lee Chapman, Transport and Climate Change:  A Rev., 15 J. 
OF TRANSPORT GEOGRAPHY 354, 355 (2007) (concluding that this pattern holds across the 
developed world). 
 38. See Chapman, supra note 15, at 356 (“[T]he major contributor is road freight which 
typically accounts for just under half of the road transport total.”). 
 39. See Pacala & Socolow, supra note 12, at 969 (raising fuel efficiency from 30 miles 
per gallon to 60 miles per gallon). 
 40. See id. (suggesting another potential wedge).  
 41. See Chapman, supra note 15, at 364 (concluding that in the short term “policies to 
change behavior and travel habits are more important than technological solutions”) (citing 
Anable, J. & Boardman, B., Transport and CO2. (U.K. Energy Research Centre, Working 
Paper, Aug. 2005)).  
 42. See Pacala & Socolow, supra note 12, at 969 (noting yet another wedge option). 
 43. See id. at 968 (pointing out the exact number of necessary wedges depends on annual 
carbon emissions growth). 
 44. See U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and 
Defense Highways, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/interstate.cfm , (last visited Oct. 
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The built environment, therefore, depends heavily on financial instruments 
and institutions that permit large scale borrowing and long-term amortization.  
The total outstanding state and municipal debt in the U.S., which is mostly 
comprised of long-term bonds issued to finance investments in the built 
environment, was $1.85 trillion in 2005.45  From this, it follows that the built 
environment must persist, not just physically but economically, far into the 
future, if the bonds, mortgages and other debt instruments are to be successfully 
retired.  “Roads, railways, canals, airports, etc., cannot be moved without the 
value embodied in them being lost.”46  As geographer David Harvey notes; 
“immobile physical and social infrastructures . . . are crafted to support certain 
kinds of production, certain kinds of labour processes, distributional 
arrangements, consumption patterns, and so on.”47  
Finally, the built environment is not only a very complex and expensive 
investment, but also the ‘habitat’ in which people live, with profound effects on 
both thought and behavior.  Expectations about resource use, for example, how 
warm or cool one’s house should be, how frequently to bathe, what counts as 
waste, or how far it is reasonable to travel for work or pleasure, are all deep-
seated dispositions formed by long-term interactions with one’s built 
environment.  These dispositions are highly variable depending on economic 
and cultural resources, and they are subject to change.  But they are, 
nonetheless, persistent.  In geographical parlance, the built environment 
produces space-time; it is naturalized as the taken-for-granted and normal.48  
This means that changing the built environment is as much a social and 
psychological challenge as it is a physical and financial one.  
Taken together, these characteristics make the built environment the site of 
a complex interplay of inertial physical structures and financial instruments, on 
the one hand, and dynamic transformations, on the other.  The dynamism stems 
not only from processes of physical wear and tear, which may or may not be 
countered by ongoing investments in maintenance and repair, but also, and 
more rapidly, by the interrelatedness of each component with the others.  
“[S]ince the usefulness of individual elements depends, to large degree, upon 
                                                                                                                 
21, 2009) (estimating the cost since 1958). 
 45. See Fed. Reserve Bd., Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States:  Flows and 
Outstandings First quarter 2006, 123 http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
releases/Z1/20060608/z1.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2009) (containing the assets and liabilities for 
the flow of funds). 
 46. HARVEY, supra note 10, at 380. 
 47. Id. at 428. 
 48. See DAVID HARVEY, JUSTICE, NATURE, AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF DIFFERENCE 222–23 
(1996) (explaining the social construction of space and time). 
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the usefulness of surrounding elements, complex patterns of depreciation and 
appreciation . . . are set in motion by individual acts of renewal, replacement or 
transformation.”49  The situation is compounded by the fact that privately 
owned components of the built environment, such as homes and factories, have 
asset values that float in the market, and their owners have a strong interest in 
protecting those values.50 
It is clear that the U.S. built environment must be changed, rapidly and 
radically, if we are to address global warming.  But we cannot easily write it off 
and start over.  We are too heavily invested in it, financially and otherwise.  
This predicament holds at every scale from households, small businesses and 
municipalities up to national governments and transnational firms.  It offers the 
best lens, I believe, through which to understand the obstacles and opposition to 
effective climate policy in the US. 
IV. Devaluation:  By Policy or by Climate? 
As fixed capital, the built environment is subject to devaluation, not only 
from ordinary use and physical deterioration but also from social and economic 
processes operating on larger scales.51  Neighborhoods decline, factories 
become obsolete, for reasons that may be entirely independent of their 
particular physical characteristics.  The market value of an inefficient car or 
home will drop as energy prices rise.  Although we tend to notice these 
dynamics most when they are abrupt and painful, they are not anomalies.  On 
the contrary, they are an intrinsic feature of capitalism, with observable 
geographical patterns.  “The total effect is that place-specific devaluations 
become more than just a random, accidental affair . . . .  The devaluations are 
systematized into a certain spatial configuration . . . .  The continuous re-
structuring of spatial configurations through revolutions in value must again be 
seen, however, as a normal feature of capitalist development.”52  When 
devaluation occurs via market mechanisms it is widely viewed as a necessary, if 
unfortunate, price of progress, for which no one can be held responsible.53  Not 
                                                                                                                 
 49. HARVEY, supra note 10, at 234. 
 50. See Freddie Mac, Freddie Mac Update:  October 2009, 9, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/investors/ pdffiles/investor-presentation.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 
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 51. See HARVEY, supra note 10, at 425 (“[D]evaluation is a social determination.”). 
 52. HARVEY, supra note 10, at 426. 
 53. See id. (“The continuous re-structuring of spatial configurations through revolutions 
in value [is] . . . a normal feature of capitalist development.”). 
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so when the cause can be identified as the conscious act of a political body; no 
one wants their durable assets, from SUVs to container ships, devalued by 
regulatory or legal mechanisms. 
In a fortuitous paradox, however, climate change renders this view of our 
predicament simplistic and misleading.  Directly or indirectly, global warming 
is going to devalue our current built environment anyway.54  It is not a question 
of whether, but when and how it will happen.  Hurricanes are projected to 
become more intense due to rising sea surface temperatures, threatening coastal 
cities with abrupt destruction such as occurred in New Orleans and along the 
Gulf Coast during Hurricane Katrina in 2005.  Sea-level rise poses a similar 
threat, with impacts that are more gradual but also more widespread and 
permanent.55  Increasingly severe weather events such as floods, droughts and 
heat waves promise to stress our existing systems for providing water and 
shelter, with potentially deadly public health impacts.56  As glaciers retreat and 
snowpack declines, large populations and economies face enormous costs to 
build or retrofit dams, reservoirs, and aqueducts to store and convey adequate 
water supplies.  Agricultural investments face possible devaluation from 
shifting climatic conditions and more frequent or intense pest outbreaks.  We 
cannot know how soon or how abruptly devaluation by climate change will take 
place for any given location, but it is clear that we should expect it to happen on 
a time-scale of decades, not centuries.  These impacts will be highly uneven 
between regions, and generally more severe in the poorer parts of the world,57 
but they will force changes in the built environment virtually everywhere, 
sooner or later, if human societies are to adapt.   
The policy implications are far-reaching.  The question becomes not 
whether widespread devaluation will occur, but how:  by the effects of climate 
change, or by intentional, deliberate policies?  This should be viewed not so 
much as a crisis but as a political opportunity.  If we assume that 2-5 percent 
annual reinvestment in the built environment is a normal necessity under any 
circumstances, then in 20-50 years we can expect it to turn over in its entirety.  
This may or may not be fast enough to avoid all, or even most, of the impacts of 
global warming, but it is a logic that everyone should be able to understand, 
                                                                                                                 
 54. See generally R. L. Wilby, A Rev. of Climate Change Impacts on the Built Env’t, 33 
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 55. See id. at 33 (rising sea levels pose a problem for cities).   
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regardless of political or ideological leanings.  If every decision we make 
regarding the built environment is made with climate change as a high priority, 
we may be able to anticipate, absorb, and in many ways control the processes of 
devaluation that are in store for us.  Framed this way, there is no clear 
distinction between mitigation and adaptation; a built environment that 
produces fewer GHG emissions is generally also more resistant to rising 
temperatures, diminishing water supplies, and declining fossil energy inputs.  
